Kant: Freedom and the Third Antinomy

Is Kant a compatibilist about freedom?

In the third antinomy, Kant outlines his views on whether free will is possible and whether it is, or whether we can know it to be, actual. Given Kant’s arguments there, is he a compatibilist or an incompatibilist about freedom and determinism?

Essay of no more than 2,500 words.

Primary sources

Kant, Immanuel: Critique of Pure Reason.A405/B532–A425/B453; A444/B472–A451/B479; A538/B566–A558/B586.

Secondary sources

Allison, Henry 1982. Practical and Transcendental Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant-Studien 73(3): 271–290. DOI
Bennett, Jonathan 1984. Kant’s theory of freedom, in Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Allen W. Wood. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Pereboom, Derk 2006. Kant on Transcendental Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(3): 537–567. DOI
Wood, Allen W. 1984. Kant’s Compatibilism, pp. 73–101 in Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Allen W. Wood. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Contemporary sources

Van Inwagen, Peter 1975. The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27(3): 185–199. DOI
List, Christian 2014. Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48(1): 156–178. DOI

General introductions

Gardner, Sebastian 1999. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. London: Routledge.
Guyer, Paul (ed.) 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI
Guyer, Paul (ed.) 2010. The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI